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Abstract
A Machine Learning (ML) -based Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) requires a large amount of labeled
up-to-date training data, to effectively detect intrusions and generalize well to novel attacks. However, labeling of data is costly
and becomes infeasible when dealing with big data, such as those generated by IoT (Internet of Things) -based applications. To
this effect, building a ML model that learns from non- or partially-labeled data is of critical importance. This paper proposes
a novel Semi-supervised Multi-Layered Clustering Model (SMLC) for network intrusion detection and prevention tasks. The
SMLC has the capability to learn from partially labeled data while achieving a comparable detection performance to supervised
ML-based IDPS. The performance of the SMLC is compared with well-known supervised ensemble ML models, namely,
RandomForest, Bagging, and AdaboostM1 and a semi-supervised model (i.e., tri-training) on a benchmark network intrusion
dataset, the Kyoto 2006+. Experimental results show that the SMLC outperforms all other models and can achieve better
detection accuracy using only 20% labeled instances of the training data.
c© 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
As we head towards the IoT (Internet of Things) era,
the number of objects that have the capability to col-
lect and exchange data is increasing at a phenomenal
rate. This is due to the advances in semiconductors,
networking, communications, sensors, and Internet re-
lated technologies, which result in ubiquitous connec-
tivity to vast arrays of Internet-based infrastructures,
services and applications, such as banking and energy
utility. Many applications in different fields, such as
social networking, economy, healthcare, industry and
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science, produce a huge amount of data namely big
data. In fact, it is predicted that there will be as much
data created as was created in the entire history of
planet Earth, with 90% of current data were created in
the last couple of years [1]. The emergence of big data
combined with the disappearing network boundaries
and the sophisticated attacks elevate the risk of net-
work intrusions. Maintaining the integrity and secu-
rity of the Internet-based services and infrastructures,
particularly from cyber-attacks, is of paramount im-
portance. Smart cities that are evolving based on IoT
technologies, for example, will simply not function re-
liably without agile secure infrastructures.
An Intrusion Detection and Prevention System
(IDPS) is an essential component of networks’ secu-
rity infrastructure, as it monitors, detects, and iden-
tifies potential intrusions. IDPSs are classified based
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on their ability to recognize known and unknown at-
tacks [2]. Rule-based IDPSs make their decisions
based on rule-sets defined by domain experts. Such
IDPSs are successful in detecting known attacks, but
they have limited capabilities in front of novel at-
tacks. Given the significant increase in network traffic,
finding and coding rule-sets of rule-based IDPSs be-
come difficult and time-consuming [3]. An anomaly-
based IDPS builds a model of normality and consid-
ers deviation from this model as an attack. Although
anomaly-based IDPSs are shown to be capable of de-
tecting novel/unknown attacks, they require pure train-
ing datasets of normal traffic in order to build their
detection models. However, collecting pure training
datasets of benign/normal network traffic is difficult
due to the high similarity between the normal and the
malicious traffic.
Machine learning (ML) algorithms have been
adopted for IDPSs due to their model-free proper-
ties, which allow them to learn complex malicious
and normality models [2]. Although ML algorithms
brought significant advantages to IDPSs by automat-
ing the generation process of the models/rules of de-
tection, they have been deployed in limited scale in
real-world [2, 4]. This is due to the fact that super-
vised ML-based IDPSs require a sufficient supply of
labeled training data. Unfortunately, data labeling,
which is normally done by domain expert, is expen-
sive in terms of time and cost [3]. In contrast, un-
supervised ML-based IDPSs, such as clustering-based
IDPS, build models with unlabeled data. However,
the performance of unsupervised ML-based systems,
in general, is not as good as the performance of su-
pervised ML-based systems [5]. Thus, with the ever-
increasing size of data, there is a need for powerful
unsupervised or semi-supervised learning algorithms
that can perform the tasks of IDPS.
This paper introduces a novel Semi-supervised
Multi-Layered Clustering (SMLC) model for network
intrusion detection and prevention tasks. The pro-
posed model mitigates the deployment issues of the
existing supervised ML-based IDPSs as it can achieve
comparable/better performance with partially labeled
data. The SMLC builds an ensemble model of multi-
ple randomized layers using K-Means algorithm. The
local learning models of the SMLC are learned from
the resultant clusters at different layers. The final pre-
diction of a test instance is obtained by choosing the
classification with the most votes of all decisions from
all layers. The contributions of this work are as follow:
• Design and development of a semi-supervised
model for network intrusion detection tasks. The
proposed model utilizes the fact that instances of
the same class-type stay close in the Euclidean
space to reduce data labeling error, which im-
proves the final detection accuracy (Section 3).
• Relying on the concept of weighted Euclidean
distance measure and atomic clusters, we argue
that the time to update model and classification
time of the proposed model can be significantly
reduced by building binary classifiers at non-
atomic clusters only (Section 3.1).
• Comparisons of the SMLC with the well-known
supervised ensemble ML models, namely, Ran-
domForest (RF), Bagging, and AdaBoostM1, and
a semi-supervised, the tri-training algorithm, in
terms of model accuracy, detection rate, false
alarm, F-score, and Matthews correlation coef-
ficient on a benchmark network intrusion dataset,
the Kyoto 2006+. (Section 4).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
an overview of current development of ML models for
IDPS. Section 3 describes the proposed SMLC model.
Section 4 discusses the settings of the experiments and
the results. Section 5 presents the conclusions of this
work.
2. Related Work
Machine Learning (ML) refers to computer algo-
rithms that learn from experiences without being pro-
grammed. A ML algorithm takes data of instance
space as an input and outputs a hypothesis of a defined
hypothesis space that describes regularities in the data
[2]. Supervised ML algorithms build learning mod-
els on training dataset of paired input instances and
their corresponding labels or outputs. On the other
hand, unsupervised algorithms group input instances
into clusters based on some similarity measures. Its
worth noting that the ability of a ML algorithm to learn
the underneath patterns in a training data and general-
ize to unseen events depends on the quality and quan-
tity of the training data [6]. Recently, combining ML
techniques, which are also known as ensemble mod-
els, has gained significant attention in ML community
as they often perform better than individual models
and adapt quickly to new concepts [7, 8, 9]. Basically,
an ensemble model generates multiple base classifiers
that commit error on identical data pattern indepen-
dently. The final verdict of ensemble model is derived
from the individual predictions of the constituent base
classifiers. Clustered ensemble [10], Bagging [11]
and Boosting [12] are well-known ensemble mod-
els. Unlike previously mentioned ML models, semi-
supervised models use both labeled and unlabeled data
to build their final hypothesis [13, 14]. Several studies
in literature, such as, [15, 16, 17, 18, 19], have adopted
semi-supervised learning approaches for intrusion de-
tection and prevention tasks. Wagh and Kolhe [15]
presented a semi-supervised approach to intrusion de-
tection. The proposed approach uses the most con-
fident filtered data from testing dataset to refine the
existing training dataset, which is used automatically
to train the system again. Chen et al. [16] proposed
Semi-supervised Multi-Layered Clustering Model for Intrusion Detection 3
two semi-supervised classification methods, Spectral
Graph Transducer and Gaussian Fields Approach, to
detect unknown attacks and one semi-supervised clus-
tering method, the MPCK-means. Li et al. [17] pro-
posed an intrusion detection algorithm based on the
semi-supervised fuzzy clustering where a few labeled
instances are used as seeds to initialize the classifier
of the system. Chiu et al. [18] introduced a semi-
supervised learning mechanism to build an alert filter
that reduces false alarms and keeps high detection rate.
The proposed mechanism uses Two-Teachers-One-
Student (2T1S) as a learner for the proposed ML en-
gine. Yuxin Meng et al. [19] applied a disagreement-
based semi-supervised learning algorithm to construct
a false alarm filter and investigated its performance on
alarm reduction in a network environment.
Contrary to the co-training-based IDPS introduced
in [20], the proposed SMLC does not require generat-
ing different views of the data. More importantly, the
SMLC presents a new methodology to generate semi-
supervised ensemble model. In addition, the SMLC
does not put any constrains on the used supervised
algorithm. The SMLC model augments the learning
process of its local learning models by: 1) utilizing the
unlabeled data and 2) dividing the training data into
mutually exclusive clusters at each layer, exploiting
that instances of the same class-type tend to stay close
to each other in the Euclidean space. The SMLC en-
hances its overall detection accuracy by: 1) providing
diversity among its base classifiers as it generates mul-
tiple randomized layers using the K-Means clustering,
2) identifying difficult- and easy-to-classify instances,
and 3) employing majority vote to find the final pre-
diction of an instance.
3. Proposed Semi-supervised Multi-Layered Clus-
tering Model
In this section, we present our Semi-supervised
Multi-Layered Clustering (SMLC) model based on the
concept of data clustering. The SMLC adopts the
work presented in [21] and exploits that resultant clus-
ters of the K-Means algorithm depend on the initial-
ization parameters (e.g., seed, number of clusters), to
provide diversity among its base classifiers [21]. Data
instances might be assigned to different clusters when
different initialization parameters are used [22]. In this
context, a layer is defined as an object of K-Means us-
ing a randomized parameter (i.e., seed). Thus, a dat-
apoint/instance might belong to different clusters on
different layers. Clusters at different layers might have
overlapping but non-identical data, though; clusters at
the same layer are mutually exclusive and might have
datapoints of one or multiple classes. To clarify this,
consider a dataset of two classes as in Fig. 1. (a). In
this context, as in Fig. 1. (b), a layer is defined as
an object of a K-Means clustering algorithm based on
one set of initialization parameters (i.e., seed). Thus,
a datapoint/instance might belong to different clus-
ters on different layers as in Fig. 1. (b), and (c).
Clusters at the same layer are mutually exclusive (i.e.,
non-overlapping). However, clusters at different lay-
ers might have overlapping but no-identical data as in
Fig. 1. (d). Hence, clusters at different layers might
be used to build diverse base classifiers, which can be
used to construct an ensemble model that covers the
whole decision space as in Fig. 1. (d).
Fig. 1: (a) a dataset of two classes (male and female). (b) resultant
clusters of K-Means algorithm using seed 1 (i.e, layer 1). (c) resul-
tant clusters of K-Means algorithm using seed 2 (i.e., layer 2). (d) a
projection of the resultant clusters at different layers.
The SMLC generates multiple layers of randomized
K-Means algorithm. Training dataset is fed to all lay-
ers in the SMLC model and portioned into K clusters
at each layer. The resultant clusters at each layer might
have datapoints/instances of different classes or one
class. We refer to the cluster of instances of one class
type as an atomic cluster (e.g., cluster 3 in Fig.1. (b)),
whereas, non-atomic cluster is defined as the cluster
of instances of multiple classes (e.g., cluster 2 in Fig.
1. (b). In order to infer dependencies of the data, the
SMLC builds local learning models on the resultant
clusters at each layer. Basically, it builds binary clas-
sifiers at non-atomic clusters and remembers the class
label of atomic clusters. In the following subsections,
we describe 1) the data clustering using K-Means and
propose weighted Euclidean distance, 2) the training,
3) and testing processes of the SMLC model.
3.1. Data Clustering and Weighted Euclidean Dis-
tance
The K-Means clustering algorithm is well-known
and widely used due to its simplicity and ease of im-
plementation [23]. However, the resultant clusters of
K-Means depend, heavily, on the initialization param-
eters. The SMLC exploits this property to provide di-
versity among its base classifiers. It also builds local
learning model on the generated overlapping but not
identical clusters at different layers.
Let x1, x2, ..., xn be a set of instances in d-
dimensional space and K is a predefined number of
clusters. The K-Means algorithm minimizes the ob-
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jective function given by [22]:
F(x1, x2, ..., xN) =
K∑
k=1
∑
xi∈ck
‖xi − x¯k‖2, (1)
where ck denotes the kth cluster,
x¯k =
1
nk
∑
xi∈ck
xi, (2)
is the center of the kth cluster, and nk is the number
of instances in kth cluster. ‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean
norm used by the K-Means algorithm. The algorithm
starts with K instances that represent the centroids of
the clusters. Each instance in the training dataset is
assigned to the centroid of the closest cluster and the
mean of the instances in the same cluster is calcu-
lated. The procedure is repeated iteratively until con-
vergence or an exit condition is satisfied.
Distance measure is an important aspect to con-
sider in the application of the K-Means algorithm. Eu-
clidean distance is the most widely used distance mea-
sure, and is given by the following [22]:
d(x, z) =
√√ d∑
j=1
(x j − z j)2, (3)
where d is the number of dimensions or features. x j
and z j are the values of the jth attribute of x and z,
respectively. Although the Euclidean distance works
well for clusters with spherical homogeneous covari-
ance matrices, it still treats all attributes equally when
computing the distance between instances. Such ap-
proach is not desirable when some attributes are more
important to discriminate between patterns [24]. As
such, deploying such measures might yield low perfor-
mance and affect the required number of iterations un-
til the convergence of the K-Means algorithm. There-
fore, we introduce the use of a weighted Euclidean dis-
tance measure based on the observation that different
attributes might have a strong impact on the resultant
partitions of data. The weighted Euclidean distance
assigns a weight for each attribute based on its signif-
icance in distinguishing between class types. These
weighted attributes can lead to a higher probability of
obtaining atomic clusters with lower value of K (i.e.,
number of clusters), which have the following advan-
tages:
1. Reducing the overall complexity of the proposed
model. This is mainly due to the fact that the
SMLC uses the class labels of atomic clusters
only, eliminating the need for building binary
classifiers.
2. Increasing the prediction efficiency of the sys-
tem, since the overall number of binary classifiers
used is reduced. In this case, the test instances
are examined by fewer binary classifiers, which
reduces the testing time per instance.
In this paper, the Information Gain Ratio (IGR) [25]
is used as an attribute’s weight, since it reflects the
utility and significance of the attribute in detecting a
class type, which is given by:
IGR(Y, A j) =
H(Y) − H(Y |A j)
H(A j)
, (4)
where Y is the class, and A j is the jth attribute. Here,
H(.) is the entropy function given by:
H(X) = −
∑
∀i
P(xi) log2[P(xi)], (5)
where, P(.) is the probability operator, and i is an index
of the probabilities in a given input. Hereafter, the pro-
posed weighted Euclidean distance based on the IGR
is given by:
d(x, z) =
√√ d∑
j=1
w j(x j − z j)2, (6)
where w j denotes the weight of the jth attribute. The
weights of the attributes are calculated and then passed
to each layer in the SMLC. The value of IGR of the jth
attribute is assigned to w j as follows:
w j = IGR(Y, A j), (7)
3.2. Training Process of The SMLC
The SMLC deals with partially labeled data. In
this case, the training data includes labeled and un-
labeled instances. Each labeled instance is given
a class label. On the other hand, unlabeled in-
stances are not given any label. Let the train-
ing dataset be denoted by T = {TLabeled,TUnlabeled},
where TLabeled = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn)}, n de-
notes the number of labeled instances in TLabeled,
TUnlabeled = {(xn+1), (xn+2), ..., (xN)}, N is the num-
ber of instances in T , xi denotes the ith instance (i.e.,
xi =< xi1, xi2, ..., xid >), d represents the number of at-
tributes, and yi ∈ Y is the class label set. Fig. 2 shows
the stepwise procedure of the SMLC. The training pro-
cess of the SMLC has two main phases:
1. The SMLC generates overlapping but diverse
clusters at different layers by using different ini-
tialization parameters set (i.e., random seed). The
K-Means generates diverse clusters at different
layers, {C1,2, ...,C1,K}, ..., {CL,2, ...,CL,K}. Here
we modified the K-Means algorithm to use the
distance measure illustrated in (6). w j is calcu-
lated according to (7) and its value is obtained
from the IGR Analyzer. It should be noted that
IGR Analyzer uses the TLabeled only to calculate
the weights of the attributes. The class labels of
the training instances have not been considered in
data clustering because the training dataset con-
tains labeled and unlabeled instances.
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2. The resultant cluster could be one of three types:
a) fully labeled cluster that contains labeled in-
stances only; b) partially labeled cluster that con-
tains labeled and unlabeled instances; and c) un-
labeled cluster. During the second phase, the
SMLC identifies fully labeled, partially labeled,
unlabeled clusters and builds a learning model on
each cluster as follows:
• In the case of fully labeled clusters, the
SMLC identifies atomic and non-atomic
clusters at each layer. Equation (8) illus-
trates how a class distribution function is
calculated for each cluster Cl,k:
FCl,k (y j) =
∑
∀(xi,yi)∈Cl,k
θ(y j, yi), (8)
where,
θ(y j, yi) =
{
1 if y j = yi
0 otherwise (9)
The cluster Cl,k is defined as atomic if it sat-
isfies the following:
Max∀y j∈Cl,k (FCl,k (y j))∑
∀y j∈Cl,k FCl,k (y j)
= 1. (10)
Thereafter, the SMLC builds binary classi-
fiers with non-atomic clusters and remem-
bers the class label of atomic clusters.
• The SMLC builds tri-training models with
partially labeled clusters, which contain
labeled and unlabeled instances, at each
layers. A tri-training model builds three
non-identical classifiers with the labeled
instances in each partially labeled cluster
[26]. The three classifiers are then refined
using unlabeled instances in the partially la-
beled cluster. In each iteration of the tri-
training, an unlabeled instance is labeled for
a classifier if the other two classifiers agree
on the labeling [26]. Unless the three base
classifiers are drawn from different distribu-
tions, they will always agree on the class la-
bel of the unlabeled instance. Therefore, the
base classifiers are initially trained on boot-
strapped training datasets from the labeled
instances. The final hypothesis is produced
via majority voting among all individual de-
cisions of the three base classifiers.
• The resultant clusters might contain unla-
beled instances only. In that case, at each
layer, the SMLC finds the nearest neigh-
bor labeled instances from the labeled por-
tion of the training dataset (TLabeled) to the
centroids of the unlabeled clusters. Then,
it combines the unlabeled clusters with its
corresponding labeled data to form a new
dataset of labeled and unlabeled instances.
Finally, the SMLC builds tri-training mod-
els on the newly formed partially labeled
clusters as described above. Fig. shows the
flowchart of building local learning models
at each layer of the SMLC model.
Fig. 2: Stepwise procedure of the SMLC.
Fig. 3: Flowchart of building local learning models at each layer of
the SMLC.
3.3. Testing Process of The SMLC
The testing process of a test instance begins with
finding the nearest clusters centroid at each layer of
the SMLC. The cluster that has the minimum distance
between its centroid and the testing instance at each
layer is selected as the appropriate cluster. Then, the
correspondent classifier at that layer is used to predict
the class type of the testing instance. The final label of
the testing instance is determined by the majority vote
corresponding classifiers at different layers.
4. Evaluation and Analysis
Thorough evaluation of an IDPS is of crucial in-
terest as many approaches fail to meet what are ex-
pected from them in real-world scenario [4]. This re-
quires an appropriate dataset that represents the real-
world scenario. The most widely used datasets are
DARPA/Lincoln packet traces [27], [28] and KDD
Cup [29] derived from it, however, these datasets
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# Name Description
1. Duration The length (seconds) of the connection.
2. Service The connection’s service type, e.g., http, telnet.
3. Source bytes The number of data bytes sent by the source IP address.
4. Destination
bytes
The number of data bytes sent by the destination IP address.
5. Count The number of connections whose source IP address and desti-
nation IP address are the same to those of the current connection
in the past two seconds.
6. Same srv rate % of connections to the same service in Count feature.
7. Serror rate % of connections that have SYN errors in Count feature.
8. Srv serror rate % of connections that have SYN errors in Srv count (the number
of connections whose service type is the same to that of the
current connection in the past two seconds) feature.
9. Dst host count Among the past 100 connections whose destination IP address
is the same to that of the current connection, the number of
connections whose source IP address is also the same to that of
the current connection.
10.Dst host srv
count
Among the past 100 connections whose destination IP address
is the same to that of the current connection, the number of
connections whose service type is also the same to that of the
current connection.
11.Dst host same
src port rate
% of connections whose source port is the same to that of the
current connection in Dst host count feature.
12.Dst host serror
rate
%of connections that have SYN errors in Dst host count feature.
13.Dst host srv
serror rate
% of connections that SYN errors in Dst host srv count feature.
14.Flag The state of the connection at the time the connection was writ-
ten.
Table 1: Features of the Kyoto 2006+ dataset.
are now outdated. In this paper, we use the Ky-
oto 2006+ dataset [30] to evaluate the performance
of the proposed model as well as other ML models.
The Kyoto 2006+ dataset contains real network traf-
fic data collected from Nov 2006 to Aug 2009. It
has 93,076,270 sessions where 50,033,015 are normal
sessions, 42,617,536 are known attacks sessions, and
425,719 are unknown attacks sessions.
Known attacks refer to networks sessions that trig-
gered IDS alarm. On the other hand, unknown at-
tacks refer to networks sessions that did not trigger
IDS alarm but contain shellcodes. Each session has 24
attributes, of which 14 attributes are derived from the
attributes of the KDD99 dataset and represent the most
significance and essential characteristics of a network
session. The attributes of contents are excluded, be-
cause they are not suitable for Network Intrusion De-
tection System (NIDS) and need domain knowledge
to extract them. Additional 10 attributes, which can
be used for further analysis and evaluation of NIDS
and determining the kind of attacks happened in the
network, were extracted and added to the attributes of
the dataset. As our main objective is to detect attacks
regardless of their type (known or unknown attack),
we consider the fourteen essential attributes and we
further give the known and unknown attacks the same
label. Table 1 shows descriptions of the attributes of
the Kyoto 2006+ dataset, excluding the class label.
4.1. Data Selection and Preprocessing
Based on the findings in [31], data of five days of
traffic is an appropriate learning size when the Kyoto
2006+ dataset is used. Therefore, we use the data from
1st to 5th January as training dataset, which has 560,
527 instances.
Labeled % Normal Attacks Unlabeled JSD
1 3,216 2,390 554,921 1.304 × 10−3
5 16,077 11,950 532,500 3.392 × 10−4
10 32,150 23,903 504,474 1.904 × 10−4
20 63,990 48,116 448,421 9.692 × 10−5
30 96,179 71,980 392,368 6.203 × 10−5
40 128,290 95,921 336,316 4.070 × 10−5
50 160,529 119,735 280,263 2.789 × 10−5
60 192,542 143,775 224,210 1.844 × 10−5
70 224,480 167,889 168,158 1.209 × 10−5
80 256,676 191,746 112,105 7.024 × 10−6
90 288,530 215,945 56,052 3.258 × 10−6
Table 2: Statistics of the selected training datasets and Jensen-
Shanon divergence.
Dataset Normal Attacks Total
Training 320,764 239,763 560,527
Validation 484,408 272,561 756,969
Testing 323,301 181,345 504,646
Table 3: Statistics of the training, validation, and testing datasets.
We study the performance of the proposed SMLC
model with the number of labeled instances in the
training dataset. Initially, we randomly remove the la-
bel of a specific percentage of instances in the train-
ing dataset (e.g., 90%, 10%) and repeat the process 10
times. Then, we pick the best representative dataset
of the ten partially labeled datasets. Here, we used
the Jensen-Shannon divergence to select the best rep-
resentative dataset based on the statistical similarity
between the labeled portion of the dataset and the
original fully labeled training dataset. The Jensen-
Shannon divergence between two probability distribu-
tions is given by [32]:
JS D(P||Q) = 1
2
D(P||M) + 1
2
D(Q||M), (11)
where
M =
1
2
(P + Q), (12)
D(P||Q) =
∑
i
P(i) log
P(i)
Q(i)
, (13)
and
0 ≤ JS D(P||Q) ≤ 1. (14)
Table 2 shows the statistics of selected training
datasets and the calculated Jensen-Shannon diver-
gence measure (JSD).
We generate validation and test datasets by merging
the data of 12 days of traffic, pulled from the last six
months of the year 2008. The merged data includes
the data of the 10th and 25th of each month from July
to December in the year 2008. We replace the data
of the 25th of September, 2008 by the data of the 23rd
of September, 2008 since the dataset does not contain
traffic of that day [31]. We use 60% of the merged data
as a validation dataset and the remaining 40% as a test
dataset. Table 3 shows the statistics of the training,
validation and test datasets.
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Actual Predicted Attack Predicted Normal
Attack TP FN
Normal FP TN
Table 4: Confusion matrix.
4.2. Performance Analysis
We compare the prediction capabilities of the
SMLC model with the well-known supervised ensem-
ble models, namely, RandomForest (RF) [33], Bag-
ging [11], AdaBoostM1 [12] and the semi-supervised
learning model, tri-training [26]. The results of the
SMLC were obtained by modifying the Java code of
Weka package [34]. The measures used to evaluate
the performance of each classifier are as follows: clas-
sification accuracy (Acc), detection rate (DR, a.k.a.,
sensitivity), false positive rate (FPR), F1-score (F1),
and Matthews correlation coefficient (Mcc). These
measures could be derived from the confusion matrix
shown in Table 4.
True-Positive (TP) is the number of correctly clas-
sified intrusions/attacks, True-Negative (TN) is the
number of correctly classified normal connections,
False-Negative (FN) is the number of incorrectly clas-
sified intrusions as normal connections, and False-
Positive (FP) is the number of incorrectly classified
normal traffic as intrusions. Acc measures the clas-
sifiers ability to correctly classify normal and attack
traffics; DR is the number of intrusions detected by
the model divided by the total number of attack in-
stances in the test set; FPR refers to the percentage of
normal traffic classified as intrusions; Mcc is a corre-
lation coefficient between the observed and detected
binary classification that has a value between -1 and
+1, a coefficient of +1 represents a perfect detection,
0 means no better than random detection and -1 in-
dicates total disagreement between detection and ob-
servation. A high value of Mcc means more robust
detection model. We aim for a high Acc, DR, F1 and
Mcc, and low FPR.
Acc =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (15)
DR =
TP
TP + FN
, (16)
FAR =
FP
TN + FP
, (17)
F1 =
2TP
2TP + FN + FP
, (18)
Mcc =
(TP × TN − FP × FN)√
(TP + FP)(TP + FN)(TN + FP)(TN + FN)
.
(19)
4.3. Parameters Tuning
The performance of the proposed model is con-
strained by two parameters, number of layers (L), and
number of clusters (K). We have studied the perfor-
mance of the SMLC model while varying L and K and
selected the values of L and K that maximize the de-
tection accuracy of the SMLC. Although the number
of clusters is empirically selected, Davies-Bouldin In-
dex (DBI) might be used to select the optimal number
of clusters. DBI is a metric to evaluate clustering al-
gorithm [35]. DBI considers the separation between
different clusters and the scatter within each cluster.
It is defined as the ratio of scatter of cluster i and the
separation between cluster i and other clusters. The
lower the value of DBI, the better the separation be-
tween clusters and dense clusters.
The final decision of the proposed SMLC is derived
from the individual decisions at different layers, aim-
ing to eliminate the uncorrelated errors among base
classifiers, which requires that each individual classi-
fier commits its error independently from other base
classifiers [36, 37]. Kohvai-Wolpert (KW) variance
[38] has been used in the literature to compute the di-
versity, which represents the correlation between base
classifiers of an ensemble model [39]. Parameter tun-
ing process might include finding the value of K that
minimizes DBI and then find the value of L that max-
imizes Kohvai-Wolpert (KW) variance.
For fair comparison, we optimized the selected su-
pervised ensemble models by using Sequential Model-
based Algorithm Configuration (SMAC) [40], which
makes progressively better estimates by considering
the configuration that outperforms the previous ones
in every comparison made. We run the SMAC algo-
rithm ten times for all selected models (i.e., RF, Bag-
ging, and AdaBoostM1), where different seed is used
in each iteration, then, we pick the best performing pa-
rameters set among the resultant ten configurations of
each model.
4.4. Comparative Performance Analysis
We compare the detection performance of the
SMLC against the semi-supervised tri-training algo-
rithm while varying the percentage of labeled data
(PLD) in the training dataset from 1% to 90%. Table
5 shows the performance of both models. The detec-
tion accuracy of both models is improved as the PLD
increases. It is noticed that performance of tri-training
reaches its maxima with a PLD of 40%. For exam-
ple, the tri-training achieved a detection accuracy of
99.24700% when the PLD is 40%, whereas it correctly
classifies 98.31208% of the testing instances with 90%
PLD value. The SMLC shows almost a stable perfor-
mance as its detection performance is positively cor-
related with the PLD value. Moreover, the SMLC
outperforms the tri-training algorithm in all perfor-
mance measures. Of particular interest is the ability
to achieve better detection accuracy using less PLD.
For example, the Tri-training achieves a detection ac-
curacy of 99.24700% using 40% PLD whereas the
SMLC achieves a detection accuracy of 99.38333%
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Model Acc% F1 DR% FPR% Mcc
SMLC 99.48221 0.99282 99.55775 0.56016 0.98878
RF 99.35222 0.99099 99.13756 0.52737 0.98593
Bagging 98.40304 0.97806 99.04602 1.95762 0.96570
AdaBoostM1 98.32952 0.97704 98.91257 1.99752 0.96409
Table 6 shows the performances of different ensemble models on the testing dataset.
The SMLC was given the following parameters: K= 7 and L=3, RandomForest, Bag-
ging and AdaBoostM1 were optimized by using SMAC algorithm and given the fol-
lowing parameters: weka.classifiers.trees.RandomForest -I 161 -K 0 -S 1 -depth 19 -
num-slots 1, Bagging: weka.classifiers.meta.Bagging -P 164 -S 1 -num-slots 1 -I 9 -W
weka.classifiers.trees.J48 -num-decimal-places 0 – -S -C 0.089484066 -B -M 36 -num-
decimal-places 0, AdaBoostM1: weka.classifiers.meta.AdaBoostM1 -P 84 -S 1 -I 12 -
W weka.classifiers.trees.J48 -num-decimal-places 0 – -C 0.19157031 -B -M 1 -A -num-
decimal-places 0.
Table 6: Performance of different models on Kyoto 2006+ dataset
when the training dataset is fully labeled.
using only 20% PLD. This is because the SMLC en-
hances the detection performance of the base classi-
fiers by building local learning models with the resul-
tant data clusters, leading to reduction in the errors due
to data labeling, and capably infer decision boundaries
of overlapping-data-patterns (i.e., non-atomic clus-
ters). In addition, the SMLC enhances its overall de-
tection accuracy by identifying easy and difficult-to-
classify instances and employing majority vote.
Table 6 shows the performance of well-known en-
semble models on Kyoto 2006+ dataset. As can be
seen in Table 6, the SMLC outperforms all other
models as it achieves the highest detection accu-
racy (99.48221%), F1-score (0.99282), detection rate
(99.55775%), and Matthew’s correlation coefficient
(0.98878), and the low false-positive rate (0.56016%),
which outperform those of RF, Bagging, and Ad-
aBoostM1.
We can observe from Table 5 and 6 that SMLC
achieves the same/better detection performance com-
pare to the performance of RF, Bagging and Ad-
aBoostM1 by using 20% PLD, mitigating the depen-
dency of ML-based IDPS on the labeled training data.
In principle, it is possible to maintain high detection
performance while decreasing the cost associated with
data labeling, promoting the deployment of ML-based
IDPS in real world. In the era of big data, SMLC ex-
ploits the abundance of heterogeneous unlabeled data
that comes from sources, to enhance the performance
of the constituent classifiers.
With the rapid growth of large data volumes not
only the detection accuracy is important but also the
efficiency and scalability. Although, in this paper,
the implementation of the proposed model was done
in single machine, conceptually, the SMLC has the
potential to efficiently handle large volumes of data
by distributing its computational cost among multi-
ple IoT devices as it provide scalable infrastructure for
large data processing on a distributed computing sys-
tem consisting of large number of processing nodes.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel Semi-supervised
Multi-Layered Clustering (SMLC) model, and its per-
formance was evaluated on the well-known bench-
mark dataset, Kyoto 2006+. The SMLC generates
multiple randomized layers of K-Means algorithm to
improve the diversity among its base classifiers, re-
sulted in more accurate detection. We show that the
SMLC, using a weighted Euclidean distance measure,
enables obtaining pure clusters of class-type instances
(i.e., atomic clusters), leading to more efficient classi-
fication. The results of the experiments show that the
SMLC outperforms the well-known ensembles as well
as the semi-supervised tri-training model with only
20% of PLD. The high detection capabilities and the
low cost denoted by the low PLD, make the SMLC
preferable for real world IDPS tasks. This can be seen
as a significant contribution as it bridges the gap be-
tween the researches of ML-based IDPS and its prac-
tical deployment.
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